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The current wave of telecommunications reform stands to significantly affect the provision of 
video over telephone networks. Several states have enacted legislation to promote the provision 
of video services by competitors, including telephone companies, and federal legislation 
regarding video franchising is also under consideration. We examine whether, on legal or policy 
grounds, video services provided over a telephone network should be regulated as a traditional 
cable service or whether a different approach is warranted. We evaluate the history of cable 
regulation and the services that Congress envisioned to be regulated when it first drafted 
legislation establishing a regulatory framework for cable television services in 1984. We then 
examine numerous differences between video services delivered over a telephone network and 
those that Congress envisioned when regulating cable television service in 1984 and in 
subsequent years when it revised the Cable Act of 1984. Finally, we find that municipal franchise 
requirements for video services provided over telephone networks would reduce consumer 
welfare. We estimate that, upon ubiquitous deployment by telephone companies of fiber networks 
to provide video service, cable customers living in areas not yet overbuilt by a wireline 
distributor of multi-channel video programming would enjoy the benefits of lower prices of 
roughly $7.15 per month, or $85.80 per year. A five-year net present value of the annualized 
savings would be roughly $26.52 billion (assuming a five percent discount rate). To the extent 
that direct broadcast satellite operators respond to lower cable prices with price reductions of 
their own, the net present value of the welfare benefits from telephone company entry into the 
market for multi-channel video programming distribution would increase by roughly 50 percent, 
to nearly $40 billion. We estimate that, even without considering any welfare gains owing to 
higher quality, these consumer welfare gains from entry exceed the potential loss in franchise fee 
revenues to municipalities by a factor of nearly three to one. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Beginning around 2004, certain local telephone companies—most notably, 
AT&T (the former SBC) and Verizon—began to upgrade their local fiber networks 
to provide a bundle of services consisting of voice over Internet protocol (VoIP), 
digital video, and high-speed Internet access. Once the fiber upgrade is completed, 
a local telephone company will have the capability to offer multiple high-quality 
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television streams that include high-definition television video (HDTV) 
programming and video-on-demand for each household. These upgraded telephone 
networks will provide a third pipeline for the delivery of multi-channel video 
programming (MVPD) services to compete against cable television operators and 
direct broadcast satellites (DBS), and will provide a comprehensive service 
package in competition with cable’s bundle of voice, video, and data services. In 
September 2005, the investment firm Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. predicted that by 
2010 nearly 40 percent of U.S. households will be able to get video service from 
their local telephone company.1
Verizon has named its new fiber network “FIOS.” Verizon plans to invest $20 
billion to lay thousands of miles of fiber-optic cables across its service area from 
Maine to Florida and into parts of Texas and California.2 As of the end of October 
2005, Verizon had initiated negotiations with roughly 300 municipalities, but it 
had secured only fourteen franchise agreements (a 4.6 percent initial success rate) 
for video service.3 Verizon’s low success rate has been attributed to “regulatory 
holdup”—that is, unrealistic demands made by municipalities in return for 
franchise approval.4 According to the Buckingham Research Group, the local 
franchise requirements will delay telephone entry into video services by between 
eight and sixteen months.5 Not only are municipalities seeking to impose onerous 
requirements on telephone companies, but some are competing directly with local 
telephone companies for broadband customers by launching citywide wireless 
fidelity (Wi-Fi) networks.6 These municipalities (which include Philadelphia, 
Madison, Minneapolis, Tempe, and Sacramento)7 have a pronounced incentive to 
raise the entry cost of rival providers of broadband service.8 Indeed, the mere 
threat that the municipality might build a broadband network could be sufficient to 
extract additional payments from local telephone companies.  
Verizon’s FIOS project started in the Dallas suburb of Keller, where the 
company offered video service to residents in September 2005.9 Verizon planned 
 
1. Peter Grant, Getting Your MTV From the Phone Company—Verizon Takes On Cable, 
Offering Cheaper TV Service, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2005, at D1 (discussing Sanford C. Bernstein 
study). 
2. Dionne Searcey, Spotty Reception—As Verizon Enters Cable Business, It Faces Local 
Static, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2005, at A1. 
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. The Buckingham Research Group, Communications Services As RBOC Video Efforts 
Falter, Outlook Improves for DBS, Cable, June 13, 2005, at 3 (“Cable operators are subject to local 
franchise approval processes, an arduous and time consuming process that can take anywhere from 6-
18 months depending on the city and state.”). 
6. Philadelphia announced in October 2005 that it had chosen EarthLink to provide citywide 
wireless high-speed Internet access. By October 2005, San Francisco received 24 proposals from a 
range of Internet and telecommunications companies interested in equipping that city for wireless 
broadband, including a proposal by Google to offer the service free of charge. See Li Yuan & Kevin 
J. Delaney, EarthLink Picked By Philadelphia To Provide Wi-Fi, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2005, at A20. 
According to muniwireless.com, a portal that tracks municipal wireless projects, the U.S. market for 
municipal broadband is expected to grow to $400 million by 2007. See Jesse Drucker, Kevin J. 
Delaney & Peter Grant, Google’s Wireless Plan Underscores Threat to Telecom—Free Internet 
Access Proposal In San Francisco Lets Users Bypass Phone, Cable Links, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2005, 
at A1.  
7. Drucker, Delaney & Grant, supra note 6.  
8. See David E.M. Sappington & J. Gregory Sidak, Competition Law for State-Owned 
Enterprises, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 479 (2003) (explaining that entities that do not maximize profit, 
which would include municipalities, have an increased incentive to attempt to harm competitors). 
9. Searcey, supra note 2. 
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to introduce its video service by the end of 2005 in other parts of the country, 
including Fairfax County, Virginia; the New York City suburb of Massapequa 
Park; a community outside of Tampa, Florida; and several communities in 
California.10 Verizon was charging $36.90 per month for 140 channels of digital 
service, and $43.90 for 185 channels of digital service, including the $3.95 rental 
charge for a set-top box.11 The telecommunications consultancy Kagan Research 
estimates that the comparable (digital) package from a cable company would cost 
$55 per month.12 UBS Securities estimates that Verizon will spend $7 billion to 
offer television service to about one-half of the 32 million homes reached by its 
network, 
AT&T has named its new fiber upgrade initiative “Project Lightspeed.” AT&T 
launched its video service in July of 2006.13AT&T predicts that it will be able to 
provide video service to nearly 19 million homes by the first half of 2008.14 For 
new builds, AT&T is extending fiber all the way to the customer’s home. For 
existing homes, AT&T is extending fiber-optic lines into nodes of those 
neighborhoods and is using enhanced copper wire to carry video signals the last 
few thousand feet to the home.15 Through this choice of network architecture, 
AT&T projects an initial cost of $4 to $5 billion to offer video service.16 
The technologies used by local telephone operators to offer video service are 
distinct. Verizon will provide television signals using the same technology that 
cable companies use, which essentially broadcasts all channels to a set-top box at 
once.17 In contrast, AT&T’s video customers will request one channel at a time 
from off-premises servers, using the same Internet protocol (IP) technology that 
enables users to access Web pages on their computers.18 
This article evaluates whether video services provided over a telephone 
network are or should be subject to the same regulations as current cable television 
services. This is an open question in policy circles and is the subject of ongoing 
debate amongst policymakers. Congress is considering legislation that stands to 
significantly affect the future of video service provided over telephone networks. 
In June 2006, the House passed legislation that would create a new national 
franchising process for companies seeking to provide video programming and 
existing cable operators which are subject to competition in their franchise areas.19 
The legislation would permit a franchising authority to impose franchise fees of up 
to five percent of a cable operator’s gross revenue and would require national 
franchise holders to pay additional fees for public, educational and governmental 
 
10. Grant, Getting Your MTV, supra note 1. 
11. Id.
12. Id.
13.  See Paul Taylor, AT&T Cheered by Internet TV Launch Feedback, FIN. TIMES, July 25, 
2006. 
14. Press Release, AT&T Inc., AT&T Initiatives Expand Availability of Advanced 
Communications Technologies (May 8, 2006), available at http://att.sbc.com/gen/press-
room?pid=4800&cdvn=news&newsarticle=22272; In re Merger of AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corp., 
Description of Transaction, Public Interest Showing and Related Demonstration at 21-22, 24 (filed 
Mar. 31, 2006). 
15. Peter Grant, Technology (A Special Report): Telecommunications—Air Battle: SBC vs. 
Verizon: The war of the TV wannabes, WALL ST. J., July 18, 2005, at R8. 
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Communications Opportunity Promotion and Enhancement Act of 2006, H.R. 5252, 109th 
Cong. (2006) (passed in the House 321-101). 
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access support.20 There have also been a number of state bills passed recently that 
are intended to facilitate competitive entry into the video programming market.21
This paper addresses the legal, policy, and economic questions presented by 
various reform proposals and their impact on the provision of video service 
provided over telephone networks. 
In Part II, we examine the historical development of cable services. Cable 
television was primarily retransmitted broadcast signals in its early stages. Cable 
systems were franchised locally, and the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) initially took a passive stance on several regulatory issues. Rival 
programming distributors did not emerge until the late 1980s, and incumbent cable 
operators responded by integrating vertically into content and then denying rivals 
access to that affiliated content. 
In Part III, we trace the development of other cable services by cable operators, 
including cable modem service and cable telephony. We examine the FCC’s 
decisions classifying those ancillary services as non-cable services, which meant 
that those services were exempt from regulation under Title VI of the 
Communications Act, as added by the 1984 Cable Act. The FCC concluded that 
cable modem service was not a cable service because the broadband user controls 
her experience, whereas the definition of cable service requires the operator to 
control the user’s experience. The FCC’s decisions on the scope of cable services 
have largely withstood scrutiny from the courts. 
In Part IV, we analyze the regulatory history of cable service, beginning with 
the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984.22 In the 1984 Act, Congress 
defined cable service as one-way programming comparable to broadcast television. 
The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 199223 sought 
to protect consumers by re-regulating cable television rates and ensuring access to 
affiliated programming by rival programming distributors, but this legislation did 
not change the definition of cable services. The Telecommunications Act of 199624 
sought to enhance competition in video programming by removing barriers to 
 
20. As of September 2006, the companion Senate bill had been marked up by the Senate 
Commerce Committee, but it was not clear whether or when further action would be taken. Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 109th Cong., H.R. 5252, The 
“Communication Act of 2006” (Comm. Print. 2002) (Senate Committee Markup of H.R. 5252). 
21. For example, Virginia passed a law in 2006 streamlining the local cable franchise process 
and attempting to create regulatory parity for existing and new cable operators by requiring, among 
other things, a local jurisdiction to impose the same requirements for franchise fees, PEG channel set-
asides and PEG capital contributions on all cable operators in the franchise area. In contrast, Texas 
and California have adopted laws to replace the local franchising process with a state franchise 
system applicable to all video providers. The law recently passed in California, which is expected to 
be signed by Governor Schwarzenegger, vests the Public Utilities Commission with the authority to 
administer state video franchises and permits incumbent cable providers, beginning in 2008, to apply 
for state franchises at the expiration of their existing local franchise or to opt-in to the state franchise 
before the expiration of their local franchise if certain conditions are met. Other states that have 
passed legislation to regulate the franchise process at the state level include Indiana (H.B. 1279, 
114th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006)), Kansas (S.B. 449, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 
2006)), New Jersey (A. 804, 2006-2007 Leg. Spec. Sess. (NJ 2006)), North Carolina (H.B. 2047, 
2005-2006 Leg., 2005 Sess (NC 2006)), and South Carolina (H. 4428, 2005-2006 Leg. 116th Sess. 
(SC 2006)). States with similar cable franchising legislation pending include Michigan (H.B. 5895, 
2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2006); S.B. 1157, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2006); H.B. 6456, 2005 
Leg. Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2006)) and Pennsylvania (S.B. 1247, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006)). 
22. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779. 
23. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460. 
24. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56. 
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entry, including barriers that prevented entry by telephone companies. Although 
the 1996 Act expanded the definition of cable service, it did not change the 
fundamental fact that “cable service” is a one-way service. 
In Part V, we explain the special case of IP-enabled video service. We explain 
how this service differs significantly from traditional one-way cable service. First, 
IP-enabled video service provided over a switched telephone network is an 
interstate service. For example, AT&T’s video service will use only two headends 
for AT&T’s entire 13-state territory. Second, IP-based video service provided over 
a telephone network is an interactive, two-way service that is controlled by the 
user. We also explain several other features that distinguish the IP-based video 
service provided over a telephone network from cable service. Applying the FCC’s 
reasoning in its recent ruling on cable modem service (which the Supreme Court 
upheld in June 2005) and the agency’s ruling on Internet telephony, one must 
conclude that IP-based video service provided over a telephone network is not 
properly classified as a cable service. A recent state regulatory decision in 
Connecticut agreed with this conclusion. Clearly, these arguments apply only to 
those entrants who avail themselves of IP-enabled technologies.  
Part VI analyzes how local cable franchising requirements would serve as an 
entry barrier that would undermine the ability of telephone company entrants to 
compete effectively with cable operators. We estimate that, upon ubiquitous 
deployment by telephone companies of fiber networks to provide video service, 
cable customers living in areas not yet overbuilt by a wireline provider would 
enjoy the benefits of lower prices of roughly $7.15 per month, or $85.80 per year. 
A five-year net present value of the annualized savings would be roughly $26.52 
billion (assuming a five percent discount rate). To the extent that DBS providers 
respond to lower cable prices with price reductions of their own, the net present 
value of the welfare benefits from RBOC entry into MVPD markets would 
increase by roughly 50 percent, to nearly $40 billion. We estimate that, even 
without considering any welfare gains owing to higher quality, these consumer 
welfare gains from entry exceed the potential loss in franchise fee revenues to the 
cities by a factor of nearly three to one. Thus, the imposition of cable franchise 
fees on IP-enabled video provided over telephony networks would generate a 
substantial excess burden as a matter of public finance policy. 
Finally, we scrutinize the potential economic justification for imposition of 
additional fees for a telephone company’s use of the rights-of-way, which the 
telephone company already has the right to use. With minor exceptions, there is no 
incremental burden to the municipality from a local telephone company’s use of 
those rights-of-way to offer IP-enabled video service provided over a telephone 
network. To the extent that the local telephone company is required to or chooses 
to pay any franchise fee, we explain why the appropriate percentage should be 
significantly less than five percent of video gross revenues, which is the maximum 
amount that federal law permits municipalities to charge cable operators. We also 
discuss why a uniform national approach to regulating IP-enabled video service 
provided over a telephone network makes more sense and is more efficient than a 
patchwork of municipal franchising. Finally, we evaluate the principal arguments 
that cable operators have made before local regulatory entities in favor of requiring 
municipal franchises for IP-enabled video service provided over a telephone 
network. 
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CABLE SERVICES 
Cable television began as the retransmission of terrestrial broadcast signals. 
Although the FCC required that a cable system carry all local broadcast signals, the 
agency was reluctant to intervene on issues such as franchising and rate regulation, 
which it left to municipalities or the states. Cable operators were largely free from 
competition in this era, as direct broadcast satellite firms did not establish a viable 
presence until the early 1990s. 
A. The Retransmission of Distant Broadcast Signals 
Cable television began in the late 1940s as shared noncommercial community 
antenna television (CATV) services to improve signal reception in areas where it 
was poor.25 An antenna could be installed on a hilltop, and broadcast signals 
received and retransmitted through a cable that fed the households in valleys and 
other areas of restricted reception. These early systems could carry only a few 
channels, and their customers were few. Non-broadcast programming was not 
offered; audiences accessible through cable were too small, and the cost of 
distributing to them would have been excessive. By the 1960s, premium 
programming was offered experimentally to only a few homes. According to a 
study by Stanley Besen and Robert Crandall in 1981, it took fifteen years—from 
1948 to 1963—to connect the first million cable subscribers.26 
The cable industry began to grow as a result of retransmitting distant broadcast 
signals through the use of microwave circuitry or very tall antennas. The FCC was 
concerned that cable television would compete with broadcasters and thereby upset 
the agency’s television spectrum allocations plan, which was meant to encourage 
localism and required a broadcaster to provide purportedly uneconomical local 
programming to its community of license. In 1962, the FCC limited cable’s 
encroachment on local broadcasters’ monopolies by requiring a microwave carrier 
to demonstrate that it would carry local signals and not distant ones that duplicated 
the programming of the local stations. 
In 1972, the FCC required that a cable system carry all local broadcast 
signals.27 The 1972 rules also severely limited the cable operators’ choices. For 
instance, in offering imported signals, cable operators could not leapfrog nearby 
stations in favor of large-market independent stations. Premium programming, 
with its extra cost to viewers, was virtually banned by a separate set of bizarre 
rules that limited such programming to one feature film more than two years old 
and less than ten years old per week for one week of each month. The same ruling 
effectively prohibited all premium exhibitions of live sporting events that had been 
traditionally available on “free” broadcast television. Many of these rules were 
eventually rescinded by the FCC or vacated by the federal courts. 
Key legislative and regulatory decisions in the 1970s and early 1980s spurred 
the growth in cable programming. In 1972, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s 
 
25. For more extensive analysis of the issues addressed in this section, see ROBERT W. 
CRANDALL & HAROLD FURCHTGOTT-ROTH, CABLE TV: REGULATION OR COMPETITION? (Brookings 
Institution Press 1996). 
26. Stanley M. Besen & Robert W. Crandall, The Deregulation of Cable Television, 44 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 79 (1981).  
27. Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration of Cable Television Report and 
Order, FCC 72-530, 36 F.C.C.2d 326 (1972). 
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assertion of power over cable’s origination of programming in Midwest Video I.28
In its 1977 Home Box Office decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit vacated the FCC rules that limited pay television offerings.29 The court 
ruled that the FCC’s “antisiphoning” rules, which were designed to protect 
television broadcasters, were an impermissible attempt to regulate cable program 
formats.30 The decision cleared the way for expanded cable services. By this time, 
low-cost satellite transmission replaced terrestrial microwave networks as the 
principal means of distributing programming to both cable systems and broadcast 
stations, thereby allowing a major expansion of cable offerings. In 1980, the FCC 
abolished its restrictive signal-importation rules, which had limited a cable 
system’s ability to import distant signals, and abolished the rules that required 
program exclusivity on local cable systems.31 Cable systems were now free to 
import as many distant signals as they desired without having to black out 
programs that were also available on local stations. 
B. Local Franchising of Cable Systems 
The municipal franchising process developed around the building of the first 
cable television systems in the 1960s and 1970s. Cable service was regulated on an 
informal basis by municipalities, which controlled the easements under and over 
public rights-of-way that cable needed to wire local communities.32 In addition to 
granting franchises, municipalities also regulated cable rates at the local level. The 
FCC remained on the sidelines for much of this era. In the 1960s, some states 
stepped into the power vacuum created by the FCC’s hands-off approach and 
began to regulate cable directly. 
Before the 1984 Supreme Court decision in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. 
Crisp,33 there was significant uncertainty over the boundaries between federal and 
local regulatory jurisdiction of cable television. In Crisp, the Supreme Court held 
that, by banning the importation of alcoholic beverage advertising into Oklahoma, 
the state had trespassed on the authority of the FCC.34 In Community 
Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, the Supreme Court held that the 
city’s three-month moratorium prohibiting the local cable company from 
expanding was not immune from antitrust scrutiny.35 As we explain below, the 
1984 Cable Communications Act was motivated, in part, to clarify this uncertainty 
over the proper division of federal and local government jurisdiction over cable 
television. 
 
28. United States v. Midwestern Video Corp., 401 U.S. 649 (1972). 
29. Home Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1977).  
30. Id.
31. Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 45 Fed. Reg. 60,186 (FCC Sept. 
11, 1980). 
32. See, e.g., JOHN THORNE, PETER HUBER & MICHAEL KELLOGG, FEDERAL BROADBAND LAW 
179 (Little Brown & Co. Law & Business 2002). 
33.  476 U.S. 691 (1984). 
34.  Id. at 704. 
35.  455 U.S. 40 (1982). 
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C. The Emergence of Rival Programming Distributors and Vertical Integration 
into Programming by Cable Operators 
Notwithstanding rate regulation imposed by municipalities, there were no 
market forces to constrain the prices of incumbent cable operators. Competitive 
multichannel distribution technologies, including direct-to-home (DTH) satellite, 
the predecessor to direct broadcast satellite, did not emerge until 1982.36 But the 
DTH business was not viable, and satellite television providers did not become 
effective competitors of cable until the early 1990s.37 Because DBS providers did 
not require local rights-of-way to transmit video programming, they were able to 
avoid the local franchising requirements imposed on cable operators. But these 
entrants faced several impediments to competing effectively, including the 
inability to secure video programming that was owned by incumbent cable 
operators. By June 1995, all DBS operators combined (DIRECTV, U.S. Satellite 
Broadcasting, and PrimeStar) had only 1.1 million subscribers.38 EchoStar entered 
the market in 1996, and the number of DBS subscribers increased to over 5 million 
by 1998.39 Cable operators had pursued a strategy of vertical integration, in part to 
achieve certain efficiencies, but also to deny downstream rivals the ability to offer 
compelling content.40 According to the FCC, 53 percent (56 of 106) of national 
satellite-delivered cable programming services were vertically integrated in 1993.41 
The Cable Television and Consumer Protection Act of 1992, which we discuss 
below, would address these issues by compelling vertically integrated cable 
operators to make programming available to rival MVPDs. 
D. Consolidation of Cable Operators at Both the National and Local Levels 
Another long-term trend among cable operators is consolidation. In 1985, the 
top four cable operators—Tele-Communications, Time Inc., Westinghouse, and 
Storer—accounted for roughly 35 percent of all U.S. cable subscribers.42 In June 
2004, the four largest cable operators—Comcast, Time Warner, Cox, and 
Charter—accounted for nearly 60 percent of all U.S. cable subscribers.43 Of the top 
ten cable operators in 1985, only two—Time Warner and Cox—operated as an 
independent cable provider as of June 2005. 
In addition to consolidating on a nationwide basis, cable operators have sought 
to collect “clusters” of cable systems within given local areas. A cluster is a 
 
36.  History of Cable Television, the Cable Center (available at 
http://www.cablecenter.org/history/timeline/decade.cfm?start=1980) [hereinafter Programming 
History]. 
37. See, e.g., PATRICK R. PARSONS & ROBERT M. FRIEDEN, THE CABLE AND SATELLITE 
TELEVISION INDUSTRIES 9 (Allyn & Bacon 1998) (explaining that DTH operators caused their original 
investors to lose hundreds of millions of dollars in the 1980s).  
38.  Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Markets for the Delivery of Video 
Programming, Fourth Annual Report, CS Dkt. No. 97-141, 13 F.C.C.R. 1034, 1070-71 (1998) 
[hereinafter Fourth MVPD Report]. 
39.  PARSONS & FRIEDEN, supra note 13, at 9. 
40. See DAVID WATERMAN & ANDREW A. WEISS, VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN CABLE TELEVISION 
(MIT Press & AEI Press 1997).  
41.  Fourth MVPD Report, supra note 38, at 158. 
42. KAGAN, TOP 70 CABLE SYSTEM OPERATORS, Mar. 31, 1985.  
43. Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video 
Programming, Eleventh Annual Report, CS Dkt. No. 04-227, 20 F.C.C.R. 2755 ¶ 143 (2005) 
[hereinafter Eleventh Annual Report]. 
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combination of geographically contiguous cable systems. According to the FCC, 
the number of clusters covering a population in excess of 500,000 persons more 
than doubled during the 1990s, from 16 to 34.44 As of the end of 2003, slightly 
more than 53.6 million of the nation’s 66.1 million cable subscribers were served 
by systems that were part of a cluster.45 Clustering of territories allows incumbent 
cable operators to migrate the distribution of affiliated programming from satellite 
delivery to terrestrial (fiber-optic) delivery, which is advantageous to cable 
operators because only satellite-delivered affiliated programming is subject to the 
program access rules created by the 1992 Cable Act.46 The practical effect of 
clustering can be to make premium regional programming (particularly regional 
sports programming) unavailable to DBS providers.47 In its 2000 Cable Price 
Report, the FCC found that cable systems that were part of a cluster charged higher 
prices than cable systems that were not part of a cluster, even after controlling for 
other factors that might affect cable prices.48 The FCC found similar results in its 
2001 Cable Price Report.49 
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NON-CABLE SERVICES 
Cable television providers invested in their networks to offer complementary 
services, including high-speed Internet access and telephony. The FCC and the 
courts have concluded that neither of those complementary services is a cable 
service, and therefore neither should be regulated as such. These rulings are 
noteworthy considering the fact that the new services are provided over the same 
cable system as the cable video service. 
A. The Development of Cable Modem Service 
In the mid-1990s, most Internet users connected with dial-up modems over 
telephone lines. Cable’s television platform made it an ideal medium for 
connecting to the Internet at much higher speeds once cable operators deployed the 
requisite ancillary equipment. According to the National Cable and Television 
Association (NCTA), between 1996 and 2004 the cable industry’s capital 
expenditures were almost $95 billion, which equates to roughly $1,300 per 
customer spent to upgrade cable systems, introduce new equipment, and launch 
new broadband services.50 Cable modem service allowed customers to download 
information at speeds 50 to 100 times faster than telephone-based modem 
technologies. Another advantage of cable modem service vis-à-vis dial-up service 
was its “always-on” feature, as well as the fact that cable modem service did not 
 
44. Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video 
Programming, Eighth Annual Report, CS Dkt. No. 01-129, 17 F.C.C.R. 1244 ¶ 67 (2002). 
45. Eleventh Annual Report ¶ 142. 
46. 47 U.S.C. § 548. 
47. See, e.g., Andrew Stewart Wise & Kiran Duwadi, Competition between Cable Television 
and Direct Broadcast Satellite: The Importance of Switching Costs and Regional Sports Networks, J. 
COMP. L. & ECON. 679 (2005). 
48. Statistical Report on the Average Rates of Basic Service, Cable Programming Service, and 
Equipment, MM Dkt. No. 92-266, 16 F.C.C. 4346 ¶ 42 (2001).  
49. Statistical Report on the Average Rates of Basic Service, Cable Programming Service, and 
Equipment, MM Dkt. No. 92-266, 17 F.C.C. 6301 ¶ 45 (2002).  
50. National Cable and Television Association, Broadband Services (available at 
http://www.ncta.com/Docs/PageContent.cfm?pageID=37). 
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interfere with normal telephone use. As of the end of the third quarter of 2004, the 
cable industry served 19.4 million high-speed Internet customers and was the most 
popular broadband access offering.51 
B. The Development of Cable Telephony and the Subsequent Movement toward 
Voice over Internet Protocol 
In addition to launching high-speed Internet access service, cable operators 
deployed circuit-switched technologies to provide business and residential 
telephone services beginning in 1997.52 Cable operators became certified local 
exchange carriers offering competitive residential voice services across the country 
on an essentially unregulated basis. Beginning in 2003, many cable operators 
launched VoIP service.53 VoIP provided many of the familiar user characteristics 
of the public switched telephone network. The NCTA has described the technology 
as follows:  
 
Calls are placed over an IP-based data network and voice is transmitted with 
data packets. The IP data packets used by services from some of the Internet 
telephony providers travel over the public Internet. Facilities-based cable 
offerings, in contrast, transport IP data packets over their private managed IP 
networks with end-to-end quality of service monitoring (while still 
interconnecting with the PSTN as necessary).54 
At the end of 2003, Bernstein Research raised its cable telephony subscriber 
forecasts to account for “cable operators’ accelerated telephony rollout plans.”55 
By the third quarter of 2004, cable operators served roughly 2.8 million residential 
cable telephony customers across the country through a combination of circuit-
switched and VoIP technologies.56 VoIP over cable modem is expected to continue 
to proliferate. Cable-company VoIP subscribers are projected to overtake cable-
company circuit switched voice subscribers in 2006. Bernstein projects that cable 
voice services will reach 16.4 percent penetration of total U.S. households by 2010 
(equal to roughly 18 percent of addressable homes),57 with 19.5 million cable 
telephony subscribers by 2010 (including both circuit-switched and IP-based 
lines), from a base of only 2.8 million at the end of 2003 (nearly all circuit-
switched).58 
51. National Cable and Television Association, High-Speed Internet Access (available at 
http://www.ncta.com/Docs/PageContent.cfm?pageID=93). 
52. National Cable and Television Association, Telephone Service (available at 
http://www.ncta.com/Docs/PageContent.cfm?pageID=32) [hereinafter NCTA Telephone Service 
Report]. 
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Bernstein Research, U.S. Telecom and Cable: Faster Rollout of Cable Telephony Means 
More Risk for RBOCs, Faster Growth for Cable, Dec. 17, 2003, at 1-3. 
56. NCTA Telephone Service Report, supra note 52. 
57. Bernstein Research, supra note 55, at Exhibit 1 (projecting that 92 percent of total U.S. 
households will be passed by either VoIP or circuit-switched systems by 2010).  
58. Craig Moffett, et al., Bernstein Research Call, Cable and Telecom: VoIP Deployment and 
Share Gains Accelerating; Will Re-Shape Competitive Landscape in 2005, at 2 (Dec. 7, 2004).  
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C. FCC and Court Rulings That Cable Modem Service and Cable Telephony Are 
Not Cable Services 
In June 2000, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided issues 
related to the classification of cable modem service in AT&T v. City of Portland.59
The court considered whether a municipal government in its capacity as a local 
franchising authority had the authority, under the Cable Act, to condition its 
approval of a cable operator’s merger on the operator’s granting open access to 
unaffiliated Internet service providers (ISPs).60 The Ninth Circuit held that the 
cable modem service at issue, @Home, was not a “cable service.”61 The portion of 
@Home that was used as an ISP was determined to be an information service, 
while the portion of @Home that provided subscribers “Internet transmission over 
its cable broadband facility” was determined to be a separate telecommunications 
service.62 
From 1996 through early 2002, the FCC declined to determine a regulatory 
classification for, or to regulate, cable modem service on an industry-wide basis.63
In March 2002, however, the FCC concluded in its Cable Modem Declaratory 
Ruling that cable modem service was “properly classified as an interstate 
information service, not as a cable service, and that there [was] no separate 
offering of telecommunications service.”64 In reaching this decision, the FCC 
considered the meaning of the term “or use” added to the definition of cable 
service by the 1996 Telecommunications Act. 
As we explain below, the 1996 Telecommunications Act added the words “or 
use” to the cable service definition, so that a cable service may now include 
“subscriber interaction, if any, which is required for the selection or use” of cable 
services.65 The FCC reasoned in its Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling that the 
amendment itself addresses only the use of content otherwise qualifying as cable 
service.66 The one-way transmission requirement in that definition, the FCC 
explained, continues to require that the cable operator be in control of selecting and 
distributing content to subscribers, primarily a medium of mass communications 
distributing the packages of video programming to all subscribers, and that the 
content be available to all subscribers generally. When offering cable modem 
service, a cable operator lacks that requisite control over the selection of the 
information by the user, and thus “the ultimate control of the experience lies with 
the subscriber.”67 The FCC’s determination that cable modem service is not a cable 
 
59. AT&T v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000), reversing 43 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (D. 
Ore. 1999). 
60. Id. at 875. 
61. Id. at 876. 
62. Id. at 878. 
63. Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All 
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps To Accelerate Such Deployment 
Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Dkt. No. 98-146, 15 F.C.C.R. 
20913, 20918 ¶ 8 (2000). 
64. Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable 
Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, GN Dkt. No. 00-185, CS Dkt. 
No. 02-52, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4799 (2002) [hereinafter Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling]. 
65. 47 U.S.C. § 522(6)(B) (emphasis added). Cable operators wanted to ensure that their 
franchise agreements authorized them to provide other services such as video on demand and game 
channels, which at the time were more advanced than traditional one-way video offerings. 
66. Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 64, at 4832 ¶ 65. 
67. Id. 61 ¶ 67. 
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service meant that the service was not subject to regulation under Title VI of the 
Communications Act, as added by the 1984 Cable Act. Finally, the FCC 
determined that cable modem service is an interstate service because the points 
among which cable modem communications travel are often in different states and 
countries.68 
In October 2003, the Ninth Circuit ruled on several challenges to the FCC’s 
Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling.69 The court affirmed the FCC’s ruling that 
cable modem service is not a cable service, but the court, relying on its previous 
decision in Portland, vacated the FCC’s ruling that cable modem service is not in 
part a separate telecommunications service. Whether cable modem service is an 
interstate service was not an issue on appeal.70 In October 2004, a number of 
parties sought Supreme Court review of the Ninth Circuit decision, including the 
National League of Cities, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the National 
Association of Counties, the International Municipal Lawyers Association, and the 
National Association of Telecommunications Officers and Advisors. The local 
government petitioners argued that the FCC action deprived local governments of 
their right to require cable operators to pay adequately for their use of public 
property for private gain.71 In December 2004, the Supreme Court denied the local 
governments’ cross petition for certiorari in the Brand X case but granted the 
review sought by other parties.72 According to the National Association of 
Counties, the decision would cost local governments more than $470 million in 
annual franchise fees associated with cable modem service.73 In June 2005, the 
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and upheld the FCC’s declaratory ruling 
on cable modem service.74 
One month before the Supreme Court’s decision to deny the cities’ petition for 
certiorari in Brand X, the FCC declared that cable VoIP was not subject to 
traditional state telephony regulation.75 In particular, the FCC preempted an order 
of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission (PUC) applying its traditional 
“telephone company” regulations to Vonage’s VoIP service. The FCC concluded 
that Vonage’s VoIP service could not “be separated into interstate and intrastate 
communications for compliance with Minnesota’s requirements without negating 
valid federal policies and rules.”76 The Vonage decision was consistent with 
previous orders adopted by the FCC in 2004, including the Pulver Declaratory 
Ruling77 and the AT&T Declaratory Ruling.78 
68. Id. ¶ 59.  
69. Brand X Internet Services v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2003), stay granted pending 
cert. (April 9, 2004), petitions for cert. filed, Nos. 04-277 (Aug. 30, 2004), 04-281 (Aug. 27, 2004).  
70. Id. 
71. Cross Petition for Certiorari, National League of Cities v. FCC, No. 04-460 (2004). 
72. Certiorari—Summary Dispositions, National League of Cities v. FCC, No. 04-460 (2004).  
73. Local Gov’t. Groups Express Disappointment Over Cable Modem Ruling; Could Create 
Serious Financial Hardships for Nation’s Communities, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Dec. 8, 2004. 
74. Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, 125 S. Ct. 2688 
(2005). 
75. In the Matter of Vonage Holdings Corporation, Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning 
an Order of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, WC Dkt. No. 03-211, Memorandum Opinion 
and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 22,404 (2004) [Vonage Declaratory Ruling]. 
76. Id. ¶ 1. 
77. Petition for Declaratory Ruling that pulver.com’s Free World Dialup Is Neither 
Telecommunications Nor a Telecommunications Service, Memorandum Opinion and Order, WC 
Dkt. No. 03-45, 19 F.C.C.R. 3307 (2004).  
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The FCC’s decisions with respect to cable broadband and VoIP can be 
defended on efficiency grounds—namely, a network operator that invests in new 
technologies should not be subject to legacy regulations that evolved under 
different market conditions. If a portion of a network operator’s revenues 
associated with a new service is captured by the municipality, or entry is 
substantially delayed, then the operator might withhold the investment entirely or 
limit the investment to areas where the expected returns are sufficiently large. The 
FCC’s decisions are consistent with section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, which instructs the FCC to encourage rapid deployment of new services.79
A consistent application of that principle would imply that a telephone 
operator’s video service—which requires a huge capital investment to upgrade 
facilities and equipment and to acquire programming rights—should not be subject 
to legacy regulations. Moreover, because telephone companies already have the 
right to use rights-of-way—just as cable operators already have such authorization 
under their cable franchises—there are no public safety or other policy grounds to 
impose additional rights-of-way requirements through a separate franchising 
process. 
 
IV. THE REGULATORY HISTORY OF CABLE SERVICE 
Congress defined cable service in 1984 as the one-way transmission to 
subscribers of video programming, reflecting the cable technology used at that 
time. Despite the fact that Congress was aware of the two-way capabilities of cable 
networks in 1984, and despite the fact that Congress revised the Communications 
Act in 1992 and again in 1996, Congress did not revise the definition of cable 
services to include that two-way functionality. 
A. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 
The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 was protective legislation for 
incumbent cable operators. The Act curbed the cities’ powers with respect to 
franchise renewal and rate regulation, yet it preserved some limited role for 
municipalities. Despite the fact that Congress was aware of cable’s ability to offer 
data and telephony services, the Act defined cable service in a manner that 
excluded these ancillary non-cable services. 
1. The Act as Protective Legislation for Incumbent Cable Operators 
The 1984 Cable Act was the first attempt by Congress to provide guidance to 
the FCC on several critical issues relating to cable television.80 The Act is best 
understood as a compromise between the interests of cities and cable operators: 
cities relinquished certain powers in exchange for, among other items, (1) the 
authority to require cable operators to upgrade and expand their video networks; 
(2) the authority to establish certain facilities, equipment, and services 
requirements; (3) continuation of local franchise fees and the ability to obtain the 
maximum fee without an FCC waiver; and (4) the ability to require cable 
 
78. Petition for Declaratory Ruling that AT&T’s Phone-to-Phone IP Telephony Services Are 
Exempt from Access Charges, Order, WC Dkt. No. 02-361, 19 F.C.C.R. 7457 (2004). 
79. Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 706, 110 Stat. 56, 153. 
80. 47 U.S.C. § 521(1).  
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companies to make available public, educational, and government (PEG) channels. 
The carrots for the incumbent cable operators were, among other items, (1) 
freedom from unreasonable demands by municipalities; (2) protection from 
competition, especially during the franchise renewal process; (3) an end to rate 
regulation in most markets; and (4) statutory limitations on franchise fees and other 
cash payments.  
Congress wanted to create national rules to govern local franchising 
procedures with the aim of encouraging the growth and development of cable 
systems.81 Before passage of the 1984 Cable Act, the FCC left the franchising 
process largely to local authorities.82 The Act established franchising procedures 
and an orderly franchise renewal process.83 By the 1980s, exclusivity for 
incumbent cable operators had become virtually universal in practice.84 Potential 
entrants unsuccessfully challenged the exclusivity provisions in franchise 
agreements under the Sherman Act.85 The 1984 Act authorized municipalities to 
grant “one or more” franchises, which the cities often interpreted as allowing them 
the prerogative to grant merely one, exclusive franchise.86 
Congress provided other protections from competition for incumbent cable 
operators because it was evidently concerned that cable operators would be 
unwilling to risk large amounts of capital to build networks if a local government 
could unreasonably deny a cable system the opportunity to renew its cable 
franchise at the end of the franchise period.87 As a result, Congress created a 
provision that restricted a franchising authority’s ability to deny renewal of an 
incumbent operator’s franchise unless the local government could demonstrate that 
the cable operator or its proposal did not meet one or more of four statutory 
standards.88 The 1984 Act did not impose a limit on the duration of a cable 
franchise. 
Finally, by codifying in section 533(b) certain cross-ownership restrictions on 
local telephone companies,89 Congress also shielded incumbent cable operators 
from entry by the local telephone company within the latter’s service area, thereby 
eliminating a significant potential competitor for the incumbent cable operator.90 
(This statutory barrier to entry was later struck down on the grounds that it violated 
the First Amendment rights of telephone companies.91)
Congress also established a ceiling on the fee that cities could charge cable 
systems for the continued access to public streets. Specifically, this annual 
franchising fee could not exceed five percent of the cable system’s gross revenues, 
and any non-capital PEG payments and other cash payments were counted against 
 
81. See DANIEL L. BRENNER, MONROE E. PRICE & MICHAEL I. MEYERSON, CABLE TELEVISION 
AND OTHER NONBROADCAST VIDEO ch. 2 § 2.02 (Clark Boardman Callaghan 1996). 
82. THORNE, HUBER & KELLOGG, supra note 32, at 229.  
83. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521(2), 521(5).  
84. THORNE, HUBER & KELLOGG, supra note 32, at 230.  
85. Id.
86. Id. 
87. BRENNER, PRICE, & MEYERSON, supra note 81, at § 2.02. 
88. 47 U.S.C. § 546. 
89. Id. § 533(b). 
90. PETER W. HUBER, MICHAEL K. KELLOGG & JOHN THORNE, FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
LAW 1196-97 (2d ed. Aspen Law & Business 1999). 
91. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993), 
aff’d, 42 F.3d. 181 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 515 U.S. 1157 (1995), judgment vacated, 516 U.S. 
415 (1996). 
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the fee.92 The cap on franchise fees can be understood as establishing a ceiling on 
the rate that would emerge under competition among rival cable operators for a 
given local franchise. For example, in an open competition for a given franchise, 
competition among rival companies for a de facto monopoly cable franchise could 
have resulted in a franchise fee that substantially exceeded five percent.93
Congress also deregulated rates in the 1984 Cable Act and preempted local, 
state, and federal rate controls in any community where the FCC found effective 
competition to exist.94 In April 1985, the FCC determined that effective 
competition existed whenever three over-the-air broadcast television systems were 
available.95 Given that an overwhelming share of the U.S. population received at 
least three over-the-air television signals at that time, this decision effectively 
ended cable rate regulation (for a time) in most of the country.96 
2. The Act’s Definition of Cable Service as One-Way Programming 
Comparable to Broadcast Television 
In the 1984 Act, Congress sought to establish a regulatory framework for the 
delivery of the kind of cable programming that existed in 1984. In particular, 
Congress sought to regulate the one-way transmission to subscribers of video 
programming or other programming service. Accordingly, the 1984 Cable Act 
defined cable television service as  
 
(A) the one-way transmission to subscribers of (i) video programming, or (ii) 
other programming services, and  
(B) subscriber interaction, if any, which is required for the selection of such 
video programming or other programming service.97 
The Act defined “video programming” as “programming provided by, or generally 
considered comparable to programming provided by, a television broadcast 
station.”98 Despite their awareness in 1984 of technological developments in the 
area of cable television—including a cable system’s ability to offer “two-way 
services, such as the transmission of voice and data traffic, and transactional 
services such as at-home shopping and banking”99—Congress defined cable 
television service to reflect the technology being used for video programming and 
to exclude “two-way” capabilities. It is reasonable to infer from this decision that 
Congress did not want to undermine the development of these “non-cable services” 
by subjecting them to regulation under Title VI of the Communications Act, as 
added by the 1984 Cable Act. In addition, perhaps Congress did not want to 
 
92. 47 U.S.C. § 542(b). 
93. See discussion at Section VI.B., infra.
94. Id. § 552(a). 
95. Implementation of the Provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Report 
and Order, MM Dkt. No. 84-1296, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,637 (1985). 
96. THOMAS HAZLETT & MATTHEW L. SPITZER, PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD CABLE TELEVISION:
THE ECONOMICS OF RATE CONTROLS 54-57 (MIT Press & AEI Press 1997). 
97. 47 U.S.C. § 522(5). 
98. Id. § 522(19). 
99. Cable Franchise Policy and Communications Act of 1984, Report on Energy and 
Commerce, No. 98-934, 47 U.S.C. § 602, Aug. 1, 1984. 
October 2006 Video Delivered Over a Telephone Network 17 
 
disturb any existing federal and state regulatory authority over the newly emerging 
non-cable services.100
Since 1984, the design of telephone system networks has changed 
dramatically. Telecommunications carriers have upgraded networks, and new 
technologies (such as packet switching combined with Internet protocol) have 
developed. For instance, as discussed in more detail below, an upgraded telephone 
network that can deliver IP-enabled interactive service is completely different from 
traditional one-way “video programming” as defined by the 1984 Cable Act. It is 
therefore implausible to interpret the definitions of a cable system or cable service 
to cover, respectively, a switched two-way local telephone network or an IP-based 
video service delivered via that network. Although individual states may have had 
their own definitions of cable services and systems, Congress established national 
legislation that would promote the growth of, and regulate, all one-way cable 
television services, not the type of IP-based interactive video services offered over 
modern, upgraded switched telephone networks. We discuss below why IP-based 
video service provided over a telephone network transcends anything that 
Congress envisioned or codified in 1984 or thereafter. 
B. The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 
The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 
focused on consumer protection, primarily through the re-regulation of cable 
television rates. The Act also promoted competition in the distribution of 
programming by mandating that vertically integrated cable operators offer program 
access to rival programming distributors, and by prohibiting municipalities from 
unreasonably denying second franchises for cable systems. Importantly, the Act 
did not change the definition of a cable service. 
1. The Attempt to Protect Consumers by Re-regulating Cable Television 
Rates and Ensuring Access of Affiliated Programming to Rival 
Programming Distributors 
Congress passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition 
Act of 1992101 to address the perceived problems created by the structure of the 
MVPD industry. By 1992, it became clear that Congress had added to cable’s 
substantial monopoly power by enacting the 1984 Cable Act, resulting in 
numerous consumer complaints about cable rate increases and poor customer 
service.102 In an attempt to constrain this monopoly power, Congress re-regulated 
cable rates, prohibited exclusive franchising, and imposed vertical and horizontal 
ownership limits. 
The 1992 Cable Act imposed new responsibilities on the FCC to regulate cable 
television service.103 To stimulate competition, downstream competitors such as 
DBS operators were granted access to all satellite-delivered programming provided 
by vertically integrated cable networks.104 Despite findings by the FCC105 and the 
 
100. Id. at 29. 
101. 47 U.S.C. § 543. 
102. See, e.g., PAUL SIEGEL, COMMUNICATION LAW IN AMERICA 469 (Allyn & Bacon 2002).  
103. 47 U.S.C. § 533(f). 
104. Programming History, supra note 36. 
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Department of Justice106 that entry into video programming by local telephone 
companies would be procompetitive on balance, Congress ignored the opportunity 
to eliminate the restriction on telephone-company video services that it had 
included in the 1984 Cable Act. 
Congress reinstated rate regulation in 1992 by allowing both state and local 
governments and the FCC to assert control over the rates for non-premium services 
that cable systems could charge their customers.107 The 1992 Cable Act established 
a complex system for regulating cable rates. Local rate regulation generally 
affected only the basic service tier. Regulation of the higher tiers was to be 
conducted by the FCC in response to complaints. Premium channels, however, 
were exempt from regulation.108 
Congress also empowered the FCC to impose both horizontal and vertical 
ownership limits on cable companies. Specifically, horizontal limits capped the 
total share of U.S. households that could receive multichannel programming from 
a single operator,109 whereas vertical limits restricted the share of its channels that 
a system operator could use to offer programming services in which it had an 
attributable ownership interest.110 In 1993, the FCC set that channel-occupancy 
limit at 40 percent and defined attributable interest to be five percent or more of 
total equity in a programming service.111 The objective of the vertical restrictions 
was to reduce the incentive of vertically integrated cable operators to favor their 
affiliated content to the disadvantage of unaffiliated services.112 
2. The Absence of Any Change in the Definition of Cable Services 
The 1992 Cable Act did not redefine cable television service.113 Although 
Congress did not consider the content to have changed significantly between 1984 
and 1992, it did consider the downstream distribution platform to have expanded 
beyond delivery of video programming services by cable systems. The 1992 Cable 
Act defined a new service provider known as the multi-channel video 
 
105. Recommendations to Congress and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Second Report and Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 
5784, 5847-51 (1992).  
106. Reply Comments of the U.S. Department of Justice at 44, Telephone Company-Cable 
Television Cross-Ownership Rules Sections 63.54-63.58, FCC Dkt. No. 87-266 (filed Mar. 13, 
1992).  
107. 47 U.S.C. § 543(a)(2).  
108. For a detailed analysis of price regulation resulting from the 1992 Act, see HAZLETT &
SPITZER, supra note 96, at 68. 
109. 47 U.S.C. § 533(f).  
110. Id. 
111. Implementation of Sections 11 and 13 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and 
Competition Act of 1992, MM Dkt. No. 92-264, 10 F.C.C.R. 4654 (1995). In 2001, both the 
horizontal and vertical limits adopted by the FCC were subsequently overturned by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. See Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d. 1126 (D.C. Cir. 
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should be imposed. Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, MM Dkt. No. 92-264 (May 17, 
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112. WATERMAN & WEISS, supra note 40, at 13. By comparing the practices of vertically 
integrated cable operators with non-vertically integrated operators, Waterman and Weiss found 
empirical evidence that vertically integrated cable operators favored affiliated programming (either 
by more frequent carriage or by lower pricing) and tended to offer fewer numbers of cable networks 
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113. 47 U.S.C. § 522(5).  
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programming distributor (MVPD).114 This category was created to assist the FCC 
in determining whether the incumbent cable operator faces “effective 
competition.” The FCC subsequently ruled that MVPDs include cable, 
multichannel multipoint distribution service (MMDS), DBS, and a telephone 
company that provides pure video dialtone transport.115 The issue of a cable 
operator’s market power was addressed once more in the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996. 
C. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 encouraged the ubiquitous deployment 
of advanced services. The Act sought to remove entry barriers and open markets to 
competition. The Act expanded the definition of cable service but did not change 
the fundamental nature of cable service as a one-way service. As we explained 
above, the FCC referred to the 1996 Act amendment in its Cable Modem 
Declaratory Ruling, reasoning that the amendment addresses only the use of 
content otherwise qualifying as cable service, and that a cable operator lacks that 
requisite control over the selection of the information by the cable modem user. 
1. The Decision to Enhance Competition in Video Programming by 
Removing Barriers to Entry 
The video provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 served to 
promote competition in the cable industry by deregulating any cable operator that 
was subject to effective competition,116 and by promoting entry among rival 
MVPDs, including local telephone companies.117 Congress established a sunset 
date of March 1999 for all rate regulation but the basic tier of cable television 
services, and it phased out the remaining rate controls that had been imposed on 
larger system operators.118 The Telecommunications Act immediately deregulated 
small cable systems,119 which served about 20 percent of the estimated 61 million 
cable households in the United States. The Act also allowed local telephone 
companies to provide video service within their service territories, a provision that 
we examine in greater detail below. 
Through the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress gave a cable operator 
the freedom to increase rates without prior notice to its customers if the operator’s 
costs rose because of a change in a regulatory fee or franchise fee imposed by any 
federal agency or franchising authority.120 An operator of an “open video system” 
(OVS), which we describe below, was subjected to the payment of fees on the 
“gross revenues of the operator for the provision of cable service imposed by a 
local franchising authority or other governmental entity, in lieu of the franchise 
fees permitted under section 622.”121 
114. Id. § 522(12).  
115. See THORNE, HUBER & KELLOGG, supra note 32, at 144.  
116. See HAZLETT & SPITZER, supra note 96, at 68. 
117. For a review of the extant video prospects for local exchange carriers in 1994, see 
LELAND L. JOHNSON, TOWARD COMPETITION IN CABLE TELEVISION 53-84 (MIT Press & AEI Press 
1994). 
118. 47 U.S.C. § 543(c)(4). 
119. Id. § 543(m). 
120. Id. § 542(g). 
121. Id. § 573(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added). 
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The 1996 Act did change the limitation on franchise fees paid by cable 
operators by adding the phrase “to provide cable services” to the sentence, “For 
any twelve-month period, the franchise fees paid by a cable operator with respect 
to any cable system shall not exceed 5% of such cable operator’s gross revenues 
derived in such period from the operation of the cable system to provide cable 
services.”122 Finally, Congress prevented a local franchising authority from 
ordering a cable operator to discontinue the operation of a cable system “to the 
extent such cable system is used for the provision of a telecommunications service, 
by reason of the failure of such cable operator or affiliate thereof to obtain a 
franchise or franchise renewal under this title with respect to the provision of such 
telecommunications service.”123 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 also removed many of the barriers that 
had previously prevented local telephone companies from competing as video 
operators.124 As explained above, the 1996 Act explicitly exempted OVS service 
from franchise fees and from certain other Cable Act requirements, including the 
requirement to obtain a local franchise. The Act’s definition of OVS service 
allowed for 33 percent affiliated programming, with the remaining capacity 
devoted to leased access on an open, nondiscriminatory basis.125 In particular, if 
demand by unaffiliated video programmers exceeds capacity, then an OVS 
operator is limited to providing programming to one-third of the capacity of its 
own system, and it is obligated to allocate the other two-thirds to unaffiliated video 
program providers.126 
In exchange for this heavier access burden, OVS providers were exempted 
from leased access, the federal requirement for local franchising, rate regulation, 
and an array of other regulations imposed upon cable systems.127 OVS remained 
subject to rules requiring PEG access and to must-carry obligations.128 The 
limitations on vertical integration and new prohibitions on competitive buyouts 
between cable and telephone companies applied to OVS.129 Finally, the 1996 Act 
eliminated the requirement that a local telephone company obtain from the FCC a 
section 214 certificate of public convenience and necessity before it could 
construct or operate a video system.130 
The 1996 Act directed the FCC to promulgate regulations to prohibit OVS 
operators from “unjustly or unreasonably” discriminating among those video 
program providers.131 In 1996, the FTC and DOJ advised the FCC that it should 
not require OVS operators to carry the programming of in-region cable operators, 
explaining that “mandated access for in-region cable systems could result in less 
effective entry from OVSs than would otherwise be the case.”132 The antitrust 
agencies told the FCC that competition in video programming distribution would 
 
122. Id. § 542(b) (emphasis added). 
123. Id. § 541(b)(3)(C)(ii). 
124. See SIEGEL, supra note 77, at 469-70. 
125. 47 U.S.C. § 573. 
126. Id. § 573(b)(1)(B). 
127. Id. § 573(c). 
128. Id. § 573(c)(2)(B). 
129. Id. § 573(c). 
130. Id. § 571(c). 
131. Id. § 573(b)(1)(A). 
132. FCC Press Release, July 19, 1996 (available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1996/07/ovs.htm).  
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increase if the OVS operators were allowed to refuse access to their systems by 
“dominant, in-region cable competitors.”133
The 1996 Act sought to enhance competition in video programming by 
removing barriers to entry, especially those that stymied entry by telephone 
companies. The 1996 Act tried to facilitate telephone company entry into video 
services. But that experiment failed. To the extent that enhancing competition in 
video markets remains an important objective for Congress, existing barriers to 
telephone company entry, including cable franchise requirements, should be 
removed. 
2. Expansion of the Definition of Cable Service, But Not in a Manner That 
Changed the Fundamental Understanding of It as a One-Way Service 
The 1996 Telecommunications Act slightly amended the definition of cable 
service. In particular, Congress amended section 522 by inserting “or use” after 
“the selection” so that the updated definition now reads: 
 
(A) the one-way transmission to subscribers of (i) video programming, 
or (ii) other programming services, and  
(B) subscriber interaction, if any, which is required for the selection or 
use of such video programming or other programming service.134 
In its Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, the FCC explained that the inclusion of 
the phrase “or use” did not imply that cable modem service was a cable service 
subject to regulation under Title VI of the Communications Act, as added by the 
1984 Cable Act. Cable service continues to be defined as the one-way transmission 
to subscribers of video programming or other programming service. 
The 1996 Act also narrowed the definition of a cable system by expressly 
excluding more services. First, the phrase “(B) a facility that serves only 
subscribers in 1 or more multiple unit dwellings under common ownership, 
control, or management, unless such facility or facilities uses any public right-of-
way” was removed from section 522, and was replaced with the phrase “(B) a 
facility that serves subscribers without using any public right-of-way.” Second, the 
exclusions that apply to telephone facilities were further expanded so that such 
facilities providing video programming may avoid Title VI regulation if they are 
used “solely to provide interactive on-demand services.” Third, open video 
systems were excluded from the definition of a cable system. The term “interactive 
service” was defined as “service providing video programming to subscribers over 
switched networks on an on-demand, point-to-point basis, but does not include 
services providing video programming prescheduled by the programming 
provider.”135 Hence, the 1996 Act amended the prior definition of a cable system to 
exclude (1) telephone facilities used solely to provide interactive on-demand 
services and (2) facilities used to provide OVS service. Finally, the 1996 Act 
provided that video programming provided in any other manner would be subject 
to those requirements of Title VI that apply. 
As explained further below, an IP-enabled video service provided over a 
switched telephone network is not a cable service and Title VI does not apply 
 
133. Id.
134. Id. § 522(6) (emphasis added).  
135. Id. § 533(b)(2)(C)(12). 
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because IP video service is interactive, it is two-way, and it is designed to be 
accessed at the subscriber’s discretion.136 This is in contrast to the definition of 
cable service, which is a one-way transmission of video programming broadcast to 
all subscribers, along with the subscriber selection and use of specific 
programming from such one-way transmission.  
 
V. CASE STUDY: IP-ENABLED VIDEO SERVICE 
The relevant statutory language and its interpretation by the FCC and the 
courts do not include the IP-enabled video service provided over a telephone 
network as a “cable service,” nor is the upgraded switched telephone network a 
cable system. Even putting aside these definitional issues, there is little doubt that 
IP-enabled video service provided over a telephone network is significantly 
different from the types of services Congress intended to cover under the Cable 
Act. As discussed below, a recent decision issued by the Connecticut Department 
of Public Utility Control reached this same conclusion. Although the analysis in 
this section is based on AT&T’s network, the same arguments could be made for 
any IP-enabled video service provided over a telephone network. 
A. IP-Enabled Video Service over a Telephone Network as an Interstate Service 
The architecture of an IP-enabled video service over a telephone network, such 
as AT&T’s network, is significantly different from that of a cable system. The 
construction of AT&T’s video service is based on a telephone network, which does 
not conform to municipal boundaries. Indeed, the AT&T network has more in 
common with a national video delivery system like DBS than with a cable system. 
When cable systems were first launched, they were deployed in one community at 
a time, with headends in each community. Cable operators could pick and choose 
which community they would serve. When complete, AT&T will have deployed 
two headends for its entire 13-state territory. The two headends distribute certain 
satellite and other programming to approximately 41 video hub offices, which 
serve regional areas within AT&T’s 13-state territory. To obtain video service, a 
subscriber communicates with a video hub office, which may or may not be 
 
136. We understand that the network architecture for AT&T’s video service is designed to 
permit maximum on-demand flexibility so that consumers can customize and order programming 
sent to their premises at their discretion. The service allows the subscriber to individually select 
which programming should be delivered (that is, transmitted) by first sending an upstream signal to 
the AT&T video hub office—unlike the mass media delivery system of cable operators, which is 
fundamentally a one-way transmission of all programming. The extent to which consumers will be 
able to access certain programming at different time slots will depend on when AT&T secures the 
appropriate copyright licenses from content owners to permit such use. An independent content 
owner—that is, one that is not vertically integrated into a cable network—will generally seek the 
largest possible downstream distribution for its content.  
In late 2005, several on-demand transactions were announced by content providers, including 
broadcast television owners. See, e.g., AOL Press Release, AOL And Warner Bros. Announce 
‘In2TV,’ New Broadband Network On AOL.com, Delivering The Largest Offering Of Long-Form 
Television Programming Online, Nov. 14, 2005, available at 
http://media.timewarner.com/media/newmedia/cb_press_view.cfm?release_num=55254474. In 
addition to music videos, Apple’s iTunes Music Store features select Disney and ABC television 
shows for $1.99 per episode. See Your 24-7 Video Store, available at 
http://www.apple.com/itunes/videos. These transactions indicate that content owners are availing 
themselves of the new distribution opportunities opened up by new technologies. 
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located in the same city (or in some cases, the same state) as the subscriber. To 
obtain other services that are integrated with the video service, a subscriber may 
send signals to equipment housed in still other states in AT&T’s territory, 
depending on what service is being requested. Ultimately, subscribers will also be 
able to manage their suite of services, including video services, from remote 
locations both inside and outside their home states. In this sense, AT&T’s video 
service is an interstate service, no different from cable modem service as defined in 
the FCC’s Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling,137 a service which is capable of 
delivering a stream of video to the subscriber. Recall that the FCC determined that 
cable modem service was an interstate service because the points among which 
cable modem communications travel are often in different states and countries.138 
The FCC also concluded that Vonage’s VoIP service could not “be separated into 
interstate and intrastate communications for compliance with Minnesota’s [state 
public utilities law] requirements without negating valid federal policies and 
rules.”139 For similar reasons, IP-enable video service provided over a telephone 
network is properly characterized as an interstate service subject to exclusive 
federal jurisdiction.  
B. IP-Enabled Video Service over a Telephone Network as an Interactive Service 
That Is Controlled by the User 
AT&T’s video service uses a two-way, interactive network. AT&T’s network 
architecture requires a two-way platform because the subscriber uses his set-top 
box to request specific individual video streams from AT&T’s servers. This two-
way functionality fundamentally differs from the one-way functionality of a cable 
television system, which transmits the entire array of possible video channels to 
the subscriber’s set-top box. AT&T’s video service is a tailored digital feed. Only 
by coincidence would multiple subscribers receive the same video program, and no
subscriber will receive a digital feed consisting of a broadcast of all program 
offerings. Unlike a subscriber on a cable television system, both the AT&T video 
subscriber, and the AT&T network itself, will be able to interact continuously with 
AT&T’s IP-based video, as the video server responds immediately to the 
subscriber’s upstream signal requesting a specific channel.  
When complete, AT&T’s video service will provide customers with several 
options to customize their viewing experience. For example, AT&T has stated that 
its subscribers will be able to customize their channel lineups and video on-
demand features.140 Additionally, subscribers will be able to simultaneously view 
multiple camera angles and statistics during live events.141 AT&T will also offer 
many interactive options that are not available through cable services. For 
example, subscribers will be able to program their television sets to display pop-up 
reminders to begin watching a particular television show. The Microsoft TV IPTV 
Edition platform will provide customers with picture-in-picture functionality, 
 
137.  Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 64. 
138.  Id. ¶ 59.  
139.  Vonage Declaratory Ruling, supra note 75, at 1 ¶ 1. 
140. Patrick Seitz, Fancy Media Players, TV Sets Will Take Center Stage At CES; The 
Largest Tech Show In U.S.; Sony PlayStation Portable, iPod accessory products also likely to get 
good play, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Jan. 5, 2005, at A4.  
141.  See note 136 supra. Although AT&T’s network will have the capability to permit such 
subscriber-directed functions, the timing and extent of availability of such functions will depend on 
contractual negotiations with content owners. 
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which will allow subscribers, among other things, to preview shows and channels 
while their primary channel continues to run in the background.142 AT&T will 
offer some features that are not available even on the most advanced cable 
platform. For example, because of its single IP platform, AT&T’s video service 
will provide functional integration with Cingular wireless service for voice, video, 
and data applications.143 
The FCC reasoned in its Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling that the one-way 
transmission component of the cable service definition requires that the cable 
operator be in control of selecting and distributing content to subscribers and that 
the content be available to all subscribers generally. The FCC explained that while 
offering cable modem service, a cable operator lacks that requisite control over the 
selection of the information by the user, and thus “the ultimate control of the 
experience lies with the subscriber.”144 Similarly, while offering switched, point-
to-point interactive video service, AT&T will lack the requisite control over the 
selection of the content by its subscribers. Because the “ultimate control of the 
experience lies with the subscriber,” AT&T’s video service is not properly 
characterized as a mass-delivered one-way cable service. 
The FCC’s reasoning in the Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling influenced a 
recent decision of the Connecticut Department of Utility Control (DPUC), which 
considered the issue of what terms and conditions govern a telephone company’s 
offering of video services.145 For some of the same reasons as discussed above, the 
DPUC concluded that AT&T’s IP video service is not a cable service within the 
meaning of the federal Cable Act and therefore is not subject to state cable 
franchising requirements. The DPUC stated that “SBC’s planned IPTV service is 
merely another form of data byte stream transmitted like other data over the 
Internet, and as such it is not subject to legacy cable franchising requirements.”146 
In its decision, the DPUC emphasized the high level of subscriber interactivity in 
IP video; the customized nature of each subscriber’s IP video service; and the 
similarities between IP video service and lightly-regulated information services, 
including data and voice services that use IP technology over telephone 
networks.147 However, the DPUC noted that it expects AT&T to carry out its 
commitments to, among other things, promote local and diverse voices, implement 
 
142.  SBC Communications at Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. Media Conference—Final, FAIR 
DISCLOSURE WIRE, June 8, 2005. 
143.  Id.
144. Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 64, ¶ 67. 
145. DPUC Investigation of the Terms and Conditions Under Which Video Products May Be 
Offered by Connecticut’s Incumbent Local Exchange Companies, Docket No. 05-06-12 (rel. June 7, 
2006), appeal docketed, No. 306CV1107 (WWE) (D. Conn. July 19, 2006).  
146. Id. at 1. 
147. In a recent decision before the new California legislation adopting a statewide 
franchising scheme (see n.24, supra), a federal district court held that it could not conclude as a 
matter of law that AT&T’s IP video service is not cable service within the meaning of the Cable Act. 
Pacific Bell Tel.Co. v. City of Walnut Creek, 428 F. Supp.2d 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2006). Further, the 
court found that even if IP video were not cable service, nothing in the Cable Act precludes a locality 
from imposing a franchising requirement on noncable video programming service offered over a 
telephone network. AT&T had sued the City of Walnut Creek because the City conditioned AT&T’s 
construction permits on its agreement to seek a cable franchise before commencing video service on 
the upgraded telephone network. The new state legislation appears to supersede this case insofar as it 
purports to define the scope of local franchising authority over video programming services. 
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limits on children’s programming, provide parental controls and public safety 
information, and carry local broadcast stations.148
C. Other Critical Differences between IP-Enabled Video Service over a 
Telephone Network and Cable Service  
IP-enable video service provided over a telephone network will differ from 
cable television service in several other significant ways. First, it will offer 
consumers far more choice of content. AT&T will include hundreds of channels 
and thousands of video-on-demand channels. AT&T’s capacity is essentially 
unlimited because of its use of digital bandwidth. “Channel” choices are limited 
only by the amount of bandwidth that can be brought to the home. From a 
customer’s perspective, AT&T’s video service will change the way the customer 
obtains programming. Because of the large number of options available to the 
consumer, web surfing may be a closer analogy to the AT&T experience than 
watching traditional broadcast television. It is anticipated that the typical customer 
will be able to store an entire season of network television programming at the 
provider’s network.149 AT&T expects that its storage capabilities will continually 
increase as its content expands. 
Second, AT&T will use a switched video network rather than a broadcast 
network. The traditional broadcast video system that cable has used 
continuously—and which is the basis of the definition of a cable television service 
in the 1984, 1992, and 1996 legislation—sends content to every customer’s home, 
and the video is displayed on the television as the cable operator generates and 
distributes it. In contrast, a switched IP video network transmits only the content 
that the customer requests, thereby freeing bandwidth for other applications. In 
AT&T’s network, video will be stored centrally at IP-video hub offices, and 
switching will specifically occur at switches and routers. 
AT&T also improves upon the current cable-system architecture, which 
requires set-top boxes to receive the complete channel schedule at all times. 
Channel changing on a cable television system occurs within the set-top box, 
which must tune to a different frequency within the schedule of channels that it is 
already receiving. In contrast, on AT&T’s switched video network a set-top box 
receives only one video program at a time, which it displays on the television 
receiver. The set-top box requests the data stream for that video program, and 
program changes occur at the instruction of the set-top box.  
Third, AT&T relies on an IP network. Rather than rely on multiple service-
specific networks, as a cable television system does, AT&T’s network integrates 
video, digital television, high-speed Internet, and VoIP into one network. All 
services that AT&T will offer will be IP-based. In contrast, a cable television 
system uses an analog broadcast for analog channels, a digital broadcast for 
premium channels, and a switched digital video network for video-on-demand. 
AT&T’s integrated IP network can offer its customers a quick delivery of 
advanced services as a result of its flexible infrastructure. 
 
148 Id. at 46. The DPUC also referred to a list of public interest commitments that AT&T 
should assume, including consumer protection and public interest and safety requirements. 
149. Rana Foroohar, Changing Channels; The idea of sitting in front of a box in your living 
room is becoming obsolete. For the TV industry, technology is creating vast opportunities—and risks,
NEWSWEEK INT’L, June 6, 2005, at 42. 
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Finally, AT&T’s video service is delivered over facilities that are already 
authorized to be in the right-of-way. In Part VI.C. below, we explain that a 
telephone company has already been granted the use of rights-of-way for the 
placement of telephone facilities and equipment. By contrast, cable television 
providers were not previously authorized to deliver services when they originally 
launched cable television service. This difference proves to be critical when 
determining the appropriate franchise fee, if any, for telephone operators and 
whether there is any public policy need for local franchising. 
The Connecticut DPUC’s July 2006 decision, state legislative developments, 
and proposed federal legislation discussed above generally indicate that the trend is 
away from legacy cable regulation of competitive video services and toward a 
lighter regulatory touch that will encourage competition and enable quicker 
delivery of new services.150 As we show in Section VI below, this movement 
promises to provide enormous benefits to consumers and is sound public policy. 
 
VI. ON PUBLIC POLICY GROUNDS, SHOULD VIDEO SERVICE PROVIDED OVER A 
TELEPHONE NETWORK BE TREATED AS CABLE SERVICE?
Public policy considerations counsel that video service provided over a 
telephone network should not be subject to cable regulation. Telephone company 
entry would produce immediate consumer benefits in video markets. These 
consumer welfare gains would substantially exceed the potential loss in franchise 
fee revenues to municipalities. Furthermore, with some minor exceptions, there is 
no incremental burden to the municipality from the local telephone company’s use 
of existing rights-of-way to offer video service. To the extent that the local 
telephone company pays any franchise fee, the appropriate percentage should be 
substantially less than the prevailing five percent. The cable franchise requirement 
probably would significantly delay the local telephone company’s deployment of 
advanced services and, in the worst case, could discourage the local telephone 
company’s investment in fiber.
A. The Consumer Welfare Gains from Price Reductions by Cable Operators in 
Response to Entry of Video over Telephone Networks 
Existing cable and DBS customers would benefit from entry in the form of 
video delivered over telephone networks. Upon ubiquitous deployment by 
telephone companies into the local MVPD markets, all cable customers would 
enjoy the benefits of lower prices that currently are available only to consumers in 
geographic areas with wireline overbuilders. To calculate the savings to current 
cable subscribers from such entry, one needs estimates of (1) the number of cable 
households that are in a position to benefit from additional entry and (2) the 
monthly savings in cable television service from RBOC entry. We estimate the 
number of cable subscribers in currently non-competitive areas by multiplying the 
number of basic cable subscribers in June 2004 from the FCC’s Eleventh Annual 
Report (66.1 million) by the percentage of cable subscribers in “non-competitive” 
 
150. The FCC has also initiated a proceeding to consider whether certain practices of local 
franchising authorities are barriers to entry into the cable market. In re Implementation of Section 
621(a)(1) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 as Amended by the Cable Television 
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd. 
18581 (FCC 2005). 
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communities (92.07 percent) in the FCC’s 2005 Report on Cable Industry Prices 
survey sample.151 Using these figures, 60.86 million cable subscribers in “non-
competitive” areas paid an average monthly price of $45.56 for cable service in 
2004. In contrast, monthly cable prices were 15.7 percent lower in geographic 
markets with a wireline overbuilder than in areas where cable operators do not face 
such competition.152 Therefore, if cable subscribers in non-competitive areas were 
to realize a $7.15 decrease in the monthly price of cable television service (equal to 
15.7 percent of $45.56) as a result of the telephone companies’ entry into the 
delivery of video services, then the annual savings across all such subscribers 
would be $5.22 billion. Because the decrease in prices would spur additional cable 
customers, an additional surplus of $0.613 billion per year would be created by the 
telephone companies’ entry.153 Figure 1 depicts the gain in consumer welfare 
(equal to the savings by existing cable customers plus the welfare gains by new 
cable customers). 
 
FIGURE 1: CONSUMER WELFARE GAINS FROM UBIQUITOUS TELEPHONE COMPANY 
DEPLOYMENT OF FIBER NETWORKS TO PROVIDE VIDEO SERVICES 
151. In the Matter of Implementation of Section 3 of the Cable Television Consumer 
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Statistical Report on Average Rates for Basic Service, 
Cable Programming Service, and Equipment, MM Dkt. No. 92-266, 20 F.C.C.R. 2718, Attachments 
1 and 6, Report on Cable Industry Prices (2004) [hereinafter 2004 FCC Cable Pricing Study]; In the 
Matter of Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for Delivery of Video 
Programming, Eleventh Annual Report, MB Dkt. No. 04-227, 20 F.C.C.R. 2755, 2759 (2005) 
(available at http://www.fcc.gov/mb/csrptpg.html) [hereinafter Eleventh Annual Report]. 
152.  2004 FCC Cable Pricing Study, supra note 151, at 2727. 
153. Assuming an elasticity of demand for cable television of -1.5, 14.3 million new cable 
television customers would emerge in response to a $7.15 price decrease. For estimates of the 
elasticity of demand for cable television, see In the Matter of Implementation of Section 3 of the 
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 Statistical Report on Average 
Rates for Basic Service, Cable Programming Services, and Equipment, MM Dkt. No. 92-266, 15 
F.C.C.R. 10,927, 10,946, Report on Cable Industry Prices, (2000) (“The estimated price elasticity of 
cable according to this equation is 1.31, which indicates that the demand for cable services is 
somewhat price elastic.”). The monthly increase in surplus for these new customers is equal to one-
half of the product of the change in price and the change in customers. These calculations ignore the 
benefits from innovative interactive services that the telephone companies’ new video service will 
deliver to consumers. 
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The savings correspond to the rectangular area bounded by the old and the new 
monthly price for cable television. The deadweight triangle gains correspond to the 
triangular area below the demand curve bounded by the old and the new monthly 
price for cable television.  
The annual welfare increase among existing cable subscribers living in non-
competitive areas from ubiquitous RBOC deployment of fiber networks to provide 
video services would total $5.83 billion (equal to $5.22 billion plus $0.613 billion). 
A five-year net present value of the annualized savings would be roughly $26.52 
billion (assuming a 5 percent discount rate). Of course, this estimate presumes that 
all MVPD households in “non-competitive” areas are passed by RBOCs on the 
first day of the first year in the five-year window. Finally, to the extent that DBS 
providers responded to lower cable prices with price reductions of their own, the 
welfare benefits from RBOC entry in video markets would increase by roughly 50 
percent to nearly $40 billion.154 
To the extent that local franchise requirements delay telephone company entry 
into the MVPD market, consumers will not receive the benefits resulting from 
greater video competition. Franchise requirements would harm consumer welfare 
in related markets as well. Telephone companies are the most effective competitor 
to the cable companies’ triple-play offering of voice, video, and data. Hence, the 
inability of telephone companies to enter video markets quickly will undermine 
their ability to compete effectively for the bundle of complementary services 
currently offered by cable firms. Thus, consumers will be denied the benefits of the 
lower prices that competition can bring. 
The cable franchise requirement could also discourage the local telephone 
company from investing in fiber. A local telephone company’s incentive to invest 
in fiber depends critically on its ability to provide video service: without the 
margins from video service, the investment might not be warranted.155 If local 
telephone companies decide not to upgrade their network or to delay such 
upgrades, then the deployment of broadband services will be slowed. 
Finally, cable operators are not currently subject to franchise requirements in 
broadband or VoIP services. The FCC and the courts recognized that the social 
costs of regulating new services (in terms of forgone innovation) outweighed any 
benefits (such as greater proceeds generated by the franchise fee). Subjecting a 
telephone company’s video offering to cable service regulation would be 
inconsistent with federal policy to promote deployment of new and advanced 
services. Telephone companies should not be saddled with legacy regulations from 
a monopoly era as they enter video markets as one of several competing providers. 
Neither cable operators nor telephone companies should be discouraged from 
 
154. The total number of DBS customers (27 million) in the United States is equal to roughly 
half the number of cable customers in areas not yet overbuilt (61 million). Because the welfare 
calculations are linear transformations of the number of affected customers, the welfare gain of DBS 
subscribers is equal to 44 percent (27 million ÷ 61 million) of the welfare gain for cable subscribers 
in areas not yet overbuilt. 
155. National Video Franchise, Local Broadband Attract Conflicting Viewpoints from 
Industry, REGULATION & LAW, July 21, 2005, at A-14. According to Brent Olson, assistance vice 
president of regulatory policy at AT&T, “this [AT&T] network doesn’t get built without video.” Id.
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upgrading their networks to deliver new services by the threat of legacy regulation 
developed under entirely different circumstances than the market conditions that 
exist today. Nor does it serve any public policy objective to regulate the third 
entrant in MVPD services behind cable operators and DBS providers. 
B. The Excess Burden on Taxpayers from Imposition of Franchise Fees on Video 
Services Provided over Telephone Networks 
As we explained above, the annual welfare increase among existing cable 
subscribers living in non-competitive areas from ubiquitous RBOC deployment of 
fiber networks to provide video services would total $5.83 billion. This potential 
welfare gain must be weighed against the potential loss in cable franchise revenues 
collected by municipalities. After all, the worse-case scenario for municipalities is 
that the RBOCs lure 100 percent of existing cable subscribers to their video 
offerings and pay the cities no franchise fee. Using a 2004 FCC estimate of 66 
million total cable subscribers in the United States,156 and using Comcast’s 2004 
estimate of average monthly video revenue from a cable subscriber of $50 per 
month,157 the total annual revenue raised under the cable franchise fee across all 
cities was roughly $1.98 billion (equal to 5 percent franchise fee × $50 per 
subscriber per month × 12 months × 66 million cable subscribers). Hence, without 
considering any welfare gains owing to higher quality, the potential benefit from 
RBOC entry into video services in the form of consumer welfare gains exceeds the 
potential loss in franchise fee revenues to the cities by a factor of nearly three to 
one. In the language of public finance, a municipality’s efforts to protect the 
incumbent cable operator and the associated cable franchise revenues generates an 
“excess burden” on taxpayers—that is, by impeding RBOC entry, the franchise fee 
could generate welfare losses that exceed the revenues raised by the franchise 
fee.158 
Moreover, the fraction of the typical city’s budget that depends on cable 
franchise revenue is miniscule. For example, the general fund revenue for Austin 
in 2004 was $452 million.159 Cable franchise revenues were $6.5 million, which 
amounts to roughly 1.4 percent of total general revenues.160 Table 1 shows the 
revenue generated from cable franchise fees and the cable franchise contribution to 
total city revenue for a sample of U.S. cities.  
 
TABLE 1: CABLE FRANCHISE REVENUE AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL REVENUE 
City Sample 
Year 
Cable Franchise
Fees 
(1) 
Total 
Revenues 
(2) 
Cable Franchise
Fee Contribution
= (1) / (2) 
Austin 2004  $6,500,000 $452,000,000 1.4% 
156. Eleventh Annual Report, In the Matter of Annual Assessment of the Status of 
Competition in the Market for Delivery of Video Programming, MB Dkt. No. 04-227, 20 F.C.C.R. 
2755, 2759 (2005) (available at http://www.fcc.gov/mb/csrptpg.html). 
157. COMCAST CORP. 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, SEC FORM 10-K at 24-25 (filed Feb. 23, 2005) 
(showing average monthly revenue per video subscriber increasing from $47.11 in 2003 to $49.87 in 
2004).  
158. See, e.g., HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 305 (McGraw-Hill 7th ed. 2005). 
159. City of Austin, Financial Performance Report for Six Months Ending March 31, 2005, at 
3. 
160. Id. at 10. 
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Chicago 2005  $14,500,000 $5,092,000,000 0.3% 
Denver 2005  $3,830,000 $739,000,000 0.5% 
San Francisco 2003  $6,980,000 $2,310,493,214 0.3% 
Washington, D.C. 1999  $2,565,000 $354,600,000 0.7% 
Sources: City of Austin, Financial Performance Report for Six Months Ending March 31, 2005; 
Government of the District of Columbia, Mayor’s Financial Report, Coming Together, Working 
Together, 2001; City of San Francisco Comptroller, Tax Revenue Report, April 2005 (estimating that 
all franchise tax revenue, including cable franchise fees, represents approximately 0.57 percent of the 
city’s general fund resources); City of Chicago, 2006 Budget, Nov. 3, 2005. The City and County of 
Denver, 2005 Adopted Budget Summary, Oct. 18, 2004. 
 
As Table 1 shows, cable franchise fees rarely contribute more than one percent of a 
city’s total revenues. Given the historical trend of increasing DBS share of the 
MVPD market, the contribution of cable franchise fees to city budgets is expected 
to decline regardless of the impact of RBOC entry in video services.  
C. The Absence of Economic Justification for the Imposition of Additional Fees 
for a Telephone Company’s Use of Rights-of-Way 
Most state and federal legislative proposals preserve the authority of local 
governments to collect a franchise fee of up to five percent of gross revenue. 
However, as discussed below, it is questionable whether such fees are appropriate. 
Local telephone companies have already been granted the use of rights-of-way for 
the placement of telephone facilities and equipment. With the minor exception of 
the placement of limited equipment, there is no incremental burden to the 
municipality from the local telephone company’s use of those rights-of-way to 
offer its video service. The local telephone company already compensates public 
owners for the use and occupation of public rights-of-way for the delivery of 
telephone service, albeit at the state level (and in certain cases, at the local level); 
consequently, the imposition of local franchise fees for video services delivered 
over the same network would amount to double recovery by local and state 
governments. The fact that the local telephone company is offering a new 
service—that is, a service other than local telephone service—over the same 
platform does not require a second franchise.161 If telephone companies are 
discouraged from entering video markets by having to pay twice (once for a 
telephone franchise and a second time for a cable television franchise) for the use 
of such rights-of-way, consumers will continue to pay supracompetitive rates for 
video service. And in those local markets where telephone companies enter but 
pass along the duplicative tax in the form of higher rates, consumers will be denied 
the full price-constraining effect that local telephone companies have offered in 
other industries that they have entered, such as long-distance telephony.162 
To the extent that a local telephone company is required to pay any franchise 
fee before it may offer video service, the appropriate percentage should be 
significantly less than five percent. Local franchise fees can be analogized to an 
auction by municipalities for the rights to offer video service. When the 
 
161. Telephone companies are already required by the Pole Attachment Act to make their 
private “poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way” available to cable television systems on a 
nondiscriminatory basis. 47 U.S.C. § 224(f)(1). 
162. See, e.g., Jerry A. Hausman, Gregory K. Leonard & J. Gregory Sidak, Does Bell 
Company Entry into Long-Distance Telecommunications Benefit Consumers?, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 463 
(2002).  
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municipality effectively guaranteed monopoly provision of cable television, it 
could demand the franchise fee associated with the monopoly price for cable 
television. Indeed, free of federal intervention and other payments to government 
employees, the franchise fee in equilibrium could be bid up to one penny less than 
100 percent of the present discounted value of net cash flows associated with 
monopoly provision of cable television. The equilibrium fee associated with the 
monopoly provision of cable television reached by cities and cable operators was 
five percent. Permitting local telephone companies to supply video programming 
represents a repudiation by the municipality of its prior commitment to protect the 
incumbent cable operator from competitive entry. Hence, a local telephone 
company should not be required to compensate the city at the monopoly-era rate of 
five percent of gross operating revenues when the market has at least three 
competitors. The city should be guaranteed no more than its forgone revenues 
(opportunity costs) under the assumption of competitive entry—not its forgone 
revenues under the assumption of monopoly maintenance. And the city’s 
opportunity cost associated with competitive entry would be significantly less than 
five percent of gross operating revenues after telephony company entry.163 After 
one determines that lower rate, it is then necessary to subtract the rate at which the 
telephone company already compensates the municipality for the rights-of-way 
(indirectly through state fees).164 
D. The Consumer-Welfare Justification for a Uniform National Approach to 
Video Franchising 
From the perspective of an individual customer, the value of subscribing to a 
network that delivers interactive services such as telephony, broadband, and 
interactive television increases as the number of subscribers on the network 
increases. Economists refer to this phenomenon as a network effect.165 The 
presence of network effects in the provision of interactive video services requires a 
wider geographical domain of regulation of local telephone operators, to the extent 
that any regulation is justified. Simply put, a local regulator would not take these 
benefits, which spill across municipal boundaries, into consideration when setting 
fees and other rules. Purely municipal regulation of franchising would result in 
franchise fees that were ineffectively high from the perspective of maximizing 
societal benefits.166 
163. In reality, the cable operator may be locked into a long-term contract with the city at the 
monopoly rate of five percent. But upon renegotiation or renewal of its contract, the cable operator 
would insist on a payment significantly less than five percent. 
164. For illustrative purposes only, suppose that a cable operator would pay only a three 
percent franchise fee under the assumption of telephone company entry. Suppose further that the 
telephone company currently compensates the city for the rights-of-way (directly or indirectly 
through state fees) at a rate of two percent of telephone revenues. The appropriate franchise fee for 
the telephone company would therefore be one percent (equal to the three percent opportunity cost 
less the two percent existing payment for the rights-of-way), adjusted for any relevant differences in 
the revenue base on which the percentages are calculated.  
165.  See, e.g., JEFFREY H. ROHLFS, BANDWAGON EFFECTS IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES 
(MIT Press 2001). 
166.  Purely municipal regulation of franchising could also result in double marginalization: A 
municipality issuing a video franchise in Los Angeles will reduce output without taking into account 
the output reduction effected by anticompetitive municipal franchising in New York. To the extent 
that a Los Angeles consumer interacts with a New York consumer over a broadband video platform, 
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Finally, state and local governments would benefit from increased 
infrastructure investment by telephone companies. Because every dollar invested 
in telecommunications infrastructure generates jobs and income through the 
multiplier effect when a local economy is not at full employment, the planned fiber 
investment by local telephone companies will generate tens of thousands of new 
jobs per year and will contribute tens of billions of dollars to the U.S. economy 
between 2005 and 2010.167 Removal of franchise restrictions could further 
contribute to expanded growth. Clearly, anything that delays these benefits from 
materializing, including the imposition of local franchise fees on telephone 
companies providing video services, should be rejected. 
E. Public Policy Arguments of Cable Operators 
In several forums, incumbent cable operators have argued on both antitrust and 
public policy grounds that video service provided over a telephone network should 
be subject to local cable franchise requirements. For example, in November 2005, 
the New England Cable and Telecommunications Association Inc. (NECTA) 
submitted testimony to the Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control 
(DPUC) during the agency’s review of regulatory requirements applicable to the 
offering of video programming in Connecticut by ILECs in general and AT&T in 
particular.168 The cable operators argued that “the [AT&T] network will operate 
like a cable television system and, from a subscriber’s perspective, provide a 
service identical to cable television service.”169 They argued further that “[a]ll of 
the ancillary on-demand and other interactive features (picture in picture, multiple 
camera angles) which [AT&T] touts as justifying deregulation either are being 
implemented or have been implemented by cable operators, or are technically 
feasible on a cable system.”170 If the issue before the DPUC was whether cable 
television service and video service offered by a telephone operator were in the 
same antitrust product market, then these considerations might be relevant. But the 
reason that franchise requirements should not apply to video systems offered over 
telephone networks, however, is not based on the substitutability between video 
services offered by the telephone company and the incumbent cable operator. 
Indeed, consumer preferences for certain advanced services, such as video on 
demand, will likely induce all MVPDs to offer a similar (if not the same) set of 
services. Telephone companies that use technologies to deliver video service 
should be free of regulation for the same reason that cable companies were 
exempted from franchise requirements for offering VoIP and Internet access 
service—namely, that the FCC and several courts chose to take a deregulatory 
approach to these innovative services. The rationale for such a hands-off approach 
is that the FCC and the courts understood that a heavy-handed approach could 
undermine advanced services or business plans in their infancy, and thereby could 
deprive consumers of large welfare gains. The same logic applies to all video 
 
the (perceived) monopoly margin will have been extracted twice. Aggregate output will be lower than 
under a single franchising authority. 
167.  See, e.g., Robert W. Crandall & Hal J. Singer, The Effect of Ubiquitous Broadband 
Adoption on Investment, Jobs, and the U.S. Economy, Sept. 17, 2003.  
168. See, e.g., Pre-Filed Testimony of Dr. Jeffrey A. Krauss for the New England Cable and 
Telecommunications Association Inc. The DPUC Decision is discussed in more detail in Part V.B. 
169. Id. at 3.   
170. Id.
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entrants who avail themselves of new technologies—not just the telephone 
companies. 
In addition to these antitrust-based arguments, incumbent cable operators have 
suggested at least four adverse policy implications of allowing AT&T and other 
telephone companies to be free of cable franchise regulation. First, proponents of 
franchise requirements for telephone companies claim that picking video over a 
telephone network as a technology “winner” would induce cable operators to make 
similar network changes solely to avoid the burdens associated with cable 
franchise regulation.171 But if video service over a telephone network is not subject 
to franchise regulation, and if these networks are deployed ubiquitously, then 
municipalities will be under tremendous pressure from the cable operators to 
renegotiate their franchises. Any new arrangements with the cable providers 
should, in theory, involve smaller franchise fees or reduced regulatory burdens or 
both because the former monopoly protection offered by the municipality would be 
eliminated. As the difference between the franchise fees paid by the incumbent 
carrier and the telephone operator decreases, any incentive of a cable operator to 
innovate will diminish. In the ideal state, the franchise fee paid by the telephone 
operator for the rights to offer a bundle of video, high-speed Internet access, and 
telephony should equal the franchise fee paid by the cable operator for the rights to 
offer the same bundle. To the extent the telephone operator already pays a fee for 
the rights-of-way to offer telephony, and because the telephone operator cannot be 
guaranteed a local monopoly on video service, the appropriate franchise fee for 
video service paid by the telephone operator should be less than five percent. 
Second, cable operators argue that failure to impose franchise requirements on 
telephone companies would “leave unprotected a number of important social 
policy goals recognized in federal and state law, including requirements for serving 
all households in a franchise area without regard to economic factors.”172 The 
suggestion that the telephone company serve all households in a franchise area 
“without regard to economic factors” is no different from the argument used 
successfully by incumbent cable operators to prevent overbuilders from entering 
several local MVPD markets. The basic economic principle of Pareto efficiency 
requires that any transaction (such as adding a competitor in a single 
neighborhood) that increases the welfare for some constituency (residents in that 
neighborhood) without making any other constituency worse off (residents in 
unserved neighborhoods) should be implemented at once. If the cable operators’ 
argument were taken to its logical extreme, then not a single neighborhood in the 
United States would be eligible to receive a second wireline MVPD unless all 
neighborhoods in the United States were served by a second wireline MVPD. 
Third, cable operators argue that failure to impose franchise requirements on 
telephone companies would encourage these video entrants to eliminate important 
“public” services such as parental control, closed captioning, and PEG channel 
capacity, which are currently provided (due to franchise requirements or applicable 
law or both) by cable operators. It is not clear why regulation is needed to 
encourage telephone operators or any other MVPD entrant to offer any of these 
services. For example, parental control of channels is a benefit that is fully 
captured by the MVPD customer. Hence, it is no surprise that DIRECTV 
 
171. Id. at 4.   
172. Id.
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voluntarily offers this feature to its customers.173 Basic principles of economics 
show that so long as consumers can internalize or fully capture the benefit of a 
service, the unregulated market will produce the socially optimal amount of that 
service. Regulation that corrects a market failure (too much or too little of the 
service produced) is needed only when customers cannot fully capture the benefits 
of a service—that is, some benefits from consuming the service spill over to the 
general public. If a positive externality is proven to exist for a given service or 
feature, then it may be appropriate to consider regulatory intervention that would 
affect all MVPDs. And to the extent that a telephone company chooses not to offer 
a specific “public service” such as PEG channel capacity, the small social cost of 
that alleged market failure would be dwarfed by the large social benefits (in terms 
of lower prices and higher quality) of having a second facilities-based MVPD 
entrant.174
Fourth, cable operators argue that failure to impose franchise requirements on 
telephone entrants would cause a severe loss of tax and franchise fee revenues. 
This argument fails to recognize that municipalities can no longer provide 
franchisees the level of monopoly protection that they once did. Hence, 
municipalities ought not to be compensated at the same level. Even if maximizing 
public revenues were the (perverse) objective of social policy, it is not obvious 
whether the decrease in franchise fees would exceed the increase in tax revenues 
from greater employment (by telephone companies) and greater expenditures on 
video services, and the economic benefits to the community from more 
sophisticated communications infrastructure. Social policy should be designed to 
maximize social welfare, not tax proceeds. And with that proper objective, it is 
clear that consumers would be better off with greater competition in the delivery of 
MVPD services. 
 
CONCLUSION 
For the same reasons that a cable operator is not subject to second and third 
franchise requirements to distribute cable modem and VoIP telephony services 
over its existing network, a telephone company should not be subject to a second 
franchise requirement to distribute video service over its existing network. These 
arguments apply to any telephone company or any facilities-based entrant with 
rights-of-way authority (such as an electric utility) that seeks to deliver video 
service. If a company is already authorized to place facilities in the public rights of 
way, then additional franchising cannot be justified on economic or policy 
grounds. IP-enabled video service provided over a telephone network is a 
significantly different service from traditional one-way cable service, especially 
due to (1) its interstate nature, (2) its high degree of interactivity, (3) the fact that it 
is delivered over a switched network, and (4) its customer-specific control features. 
Moreover, a cable franchise requirement would serve as an entry barrier that would 
undermine the ability of telephone company entrants to compete effectively with 
 
173. We understand that Congress may be investigating parental control as part of its larger 
review of indecency issues. But Congress is not responding to a market failure relating to parental 
control, and factors other than marketplace considerations are likely to influence any possible 
Congressional action in this area. 
174. Moreover, in the case of PEG, the public policy need or rationale for “obligating” such 
requirements should be reevaluated by municipalities in light of the development of the Internet as an 
effective means of expression and communications. 
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cable operators across video, voice, and broadband markets. Payment of franchise 
fees would be duplicative of payments already made to state and local 
governments. To the extent that a telephone company is required to pay any 
franchise fee before it may offer video service in its existing territory, the 
appropriate percentage is significantly less than five percent. 
Some of the policy arguments made in this paper are now being recognized in 
state legislation and federal legislative proposals designed to encourage 
competition in the video programming market and to free video programming 
entrants, including telephone companies, from legacy cable franchising 
requirements. This emerging legislative trend will enhance consumer welfare and 
should be implemented on a uniform national basis. 
